Where Rescission may be Adjudged or Refused – Section 27 | Specific Relief Act

Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 Provides that:

1. Equitable relief:

The Supreme Court on aspects of equitable relief observed as follows:

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“9. We are of the view that the High Court failed to address itself to certain crucial factors which disentitles the plaintiff to equitable re­lief. The High Court reversed a well-considered judgment of the Trial Court without adverting to the reasoning of the trial Court except in a cursory manner. In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for us to dilate on various legal issues debated before us. We shall proceed on the basis that in law the plaintiff could annul the con­tract of sale before the act of registration got completed and title passed to the appellants. We shall further assume that the plaintiff in fact rescinded the contract with effect from the date of expiry of the time stipulated in the fourth and final notice dated 3.7.1973. If such rescission or termination of contract is not justifiable on facts or having regard to the conduct of the plaintiff, the equitable relief under Section 27 or 31 of the Specific Relief Act has to be denied to the plaintiff, no further question arises for consideration. In such a case, the appellants’ plea has to be accepted and the suit is liable to be dismissed.”

2. Justification of:

In law the plaintiff could annul the contract of sale before the act of registration got completed and title passed to the appel­lants. The plaintiff in fact rescinded the contract with effect from the date of expiry of the time stipulated notice if such rescission or termination of con­tract is not justifiable on facts or having regard to the conduct of the plain­tiff, the equitable relief under Section 27 or 31 of the Specific Relief Act has to be denied to the plaintiff, no further question arises for consideration. In such a case, the appellant’s plea has to be accepted and the suites liable to be dismissed.

3. Permissibility of:

In substance statutory provisions under Sections 23, 13 and 27B lay down that, subject to certain exceptions which are not material in this case, a contract in the absence of a contrary intention ex­press or implied will be enforceable by and against the parties and their legal heirs and legal representatives including assignees and transferees.

In the present case, there is nothing in the language of the pre-emption clause or the other clauses of the award to suggest that the parties had any con­trary intention. On the other hand references to the other clauses of the award show that the parties intended that the obligations and benefit of the contract should go to the assignee or successors-in-interest.

It is obvious that in these clauses the expression “parties” cannot be restricted to the original parties to the contract but must include the legal representatives and assignees of the original parties. There is hence no reason why the same expression should be given a restricted meaning in the pre-emption clause which is the subject-matter of interpretation in the present appeal.

The rule against perpetuities is not concerned with contracts as such or with contractual rights and obligations as such. Thus a contract to pay money to a person, his heirs or legal representatives upon a further contingency, which may happen beyond the period prescribed would be perfectly valid.

4. Relief of possession:

The relief of possession can be granted in a case where suit has been filed under Section 27 of the Act of 1963 because of the reason that the plaintiff can file the suit for declaration with conse­quential relief, which he can get because of declaration.