Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Grievous Hurt:
The following kinds of hurt only are designated as grievous hurt—
(i) Emasculation;
Image Source: img07.deviantart.net
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(ii) , (iii) permanent privation of sight of either eye or hearing of either ear;
(iv) Privation of any member or joint;
(v) Destruction or permanent impairing of powers of any member or joint;
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(vi) Permanent disfiguration of the head or face;
(vii) Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth;
(viii) Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.
It is not necessary that a bone should be out through and through or that the crack must extend from the outer to the inner surface or that there should be displacement or any fragment of the bone.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
If there is a break by cutting of splintering of the bone or there is a rupture or fissure in it, it would amount to a fracture within the meaning of clause (7) of Section 320. What Court has to see is whether the cuts in the bones noticed in the injury report are only superficial or do they effect a break in them.
This view has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Naib Singh v. State of Punjab, wherein it has been pointed out that it is not correct to say that a partial cut of the skull vault is seldom so prominent except when excessive force is used in inflecting the injury.
In the instant case it appeared from the evidence that the victim was putting on a turban when assaulted with the gandasa. What saved him was the turban and it took away the force of the impact leaving a head injury. In the circumstances, it was held that there was a fracture within the meaning of clause (7) of Section 320 and the accused could be convicted under Section 326 and not under Section 324.
Merely being treated as indoor patient for more than 30 days cannot be taken up as equivalent to proof of grievous hurt.
Sections 321 and 322 define what is meant by the expression “voluntarily causing hurt” and “voluntarily causing grievous hurt”. Whoever does any act with the intention to cause or knowledge that he is thereby likely to cause simple or grievous hurt to any person and causes the hurt so intended or known to be likely is said to voluntarily cause hurt or grievous hurt, as the case may be (Sections 321-322).
A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt if both the hurt intended or known to be likely and the hurt caused are not grievous, i.e., for the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt it is necessary that (i) the hurt caused should be grievous; and (ii) the hurt intended should also be grievous.
The offence shall not be constituted if any of the two is simple. It does not matter or make any difference in case of grievous hurt if the grievous hurt caused is of a kind different from the grievous hurt intended to be caused.
Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt, i.e., simple hurt is imprisonment of either description upto one year, or fine upto Rs. 1,000 or both (Section 323) and for voluntarily causing grievous hurt imprisonment upto 7 years and fine (Section 325).
In the case of Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court has held that for convicting a person under Section 323 the age group shall also be a material factor. In the instant case the Court, in the circumstances, disbelieved the said charge against an accused aged 80 years.
According to Section 325, I.P.C., a person is guilty of causing grievous hurt if he does so voluntarily. Section 39 defines that a person is said to cause or effect “voluntarily” when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it.
It can be said that when the accused delivered a lathi blow, lie could know that it was likely to fall on the child which was being carried by D on his shoulder, but it cannot be said that he knew or he had reason to believe that it was likely to cause grievous hurt.
According to Explanation to Section 322, a person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt except when he both causes grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt.
The act was such that nothing more than a simple hurt could reasonably be thought to be likely to ensue though a grievous hurt may have been the unexpected result. The accused can be convicted of simple hurt only.
It was contended that while inflicting injuries the accused had no intention or knowledge that he was likely to cause a grievous hurt during the assault on the victim. It was urged that unless there was a clear finding regarding such intention or knowledge, the accused could not be held guilty of an offence under Section 325, I.P.C. The contention could not be upheld.
The weapon was an iron rod which was hit on the left fore-arm causing fracture of shaft of left ulna (inner bone of the fore-arm). Fracture of bone finds place in the category of grievous injuries. This strike was sufficient to cause fracture of that part of the bone.
The accused hit with the weapon after taking it out from inside his house. On a consideration of these facts, he can well be attributed with the knowledge that by doing so he was likely to cause grievous hurt.
In case of Fatiibhushandas v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court reduced the punishment of two accused who have been convicted under Section 304(ii) by the Session Court. The Supreme Court did this act due to discrepancy in the evidence though 21 years have passed after awarding the punishment by Session Court.
The accused with 14 other members were a member of an unlawful assembly. The accused with certain other members, caused injury to the deceased with lathi and iron rods consequently the person died.
Two accused were convicted by Session Court under Section 304(ii) of I.P.C. who were actual wrongdoer. The remaining accuseds were acquitted because they were only the member of unlawful assembly but did nothing.
The offences under Sections 324 and 325 are compoundable with the permission of the Court even before the Appellate Court. In many cases before the Supreme Court it was stated that the parties have amicably settled the matter, it would be in the fitness of things if permission to compound the offence is granted. As such the necessary permission was granted by the Court and the conviction was set aside.
The deceased received only two injuries which were not grievous. The injuries were only remoter cause of death and so the accused could be convicted under Section 323 and not under Section 304.
The accused pulled the deceased out of a cot, kicked him and struck him on the side or on the ribs with a stick, whereby the deceased, whose spleen was diseased already, died. The Court held that he was guilty of voluntarily causing grievous hurt.
Sudden quarrel after hot exchange of abuses. No evidence to show which accused assaulted deceased with sticks. Intention to cause death not proved but common intention to cause grievous hurt was apparent. Offence falls under Section 325/34, I.P.C.
In State of Haryana v. Prabhu and others, common object of assembly to give merely ‘ beating to the member of complainant party, the main target being one M. No common object to commit the murder of the deceased.
Nature of injuries clearly showing that neither the common object was to kill nor was it possible to infer that any member had the knowledge that death was likely to be caused in prosecution of common object of assault. It has been held that they were guilty under Section 325 read with Section 149, I.P.C.