The distinction between conditional and delegated legislation is that, in the former, the delegated power is that of determining when a legislative declared rule of conduct shall become effective, Hampton & Co. v. United State, (1927) 276 U.S. 394] and the later involves delegation of rule-making power which constitutionally may be exercised by the administrative agent.
This means that legislature; having laid down the broad principles of its policy in the legislation can then leave the details to be supplied by the administrative authority.
In other words by delegated legislation the delegate completes the legislation by supplying details within the limits prescribed by the statute, while, in the case of conditional legislature the power of legislation is exercised by the legislature conditionally leaving to the discretion of an external authority, the time and manner of carrying its legislation into effect as to also the determination of the area to which it is to extend.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
Queen v. Burah: (1878) 3 A.C.889, Charles Russel v. Queen (1882) 7 A.C.829 at p. 835; Emperor v. Benoarilal Sharma, A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 48: A. 57; I rider Singh v. State of Raj as- than, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 510: 1957: S.C.R. 605; Raghunath Pandey v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1982 Patnal],
Thus, when the delegate is given the power of making rules and regulations in order to fill in the details to carry out and sub serve the purposes of the legislation, the manner in which the requirements of the statute are to be met and the rights created therein to be enjoyed, ids an exercise of delegated legislation.
But when the legislation is complete in itself and the legislature has itself made the law and the only function left to the delegate is to apply the law to an area or to determine the time and manner of carrying it into effect it is conditional legislation.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
Hamdard Dawakhana. V. Union of India, A.I.R. 1960, S.C. 554. To put in the language of American case Field and Co. v. Clark. (1982) 143 U.S. 649: 36 Law Ed. 294:
“To assert that a law is less than a law because it is made to depend upon a future event or act to rob the legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed or the things future and impossible to fully know.”
The proper distinction was pointed out in this case thus: “The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make to a law delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend.
There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the lawmaking power and must, therefore, be subject of enquiry and determination outside the hall of legislature.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
But the discretion should not be so wide that it is impossible to discern its limits. There must, instead, be definite boundaries within which the powers of the administrative authority are exercisable. Delegation should not be so indefinite as to amount to an abdication of the legislative function. (Schwartze: American Administrative Law, P- 21).