There are four principles governing joint offenders:
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(1) When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for the act in the same manner as if it had been done by him alone. (Section 34)
ADVERTISEMENTS:
The condition for the application of the above principle is that the act in question must be in furtherance of common intention of all. Common intention does not mean the “same intention”.
An act may be done by two different persons with the same intention and yet they may not have a common intention between them. The one may not know the intention of the other though each one has the same intention.
The barrier between the minds must disappear before such intention becomes a common intention. In other words, there must be a pre-arranged plan, a meeting of minds, an intention agreed upon by two or more persons as the intention of all such persons.
If in furthering or realising such intention any one of such persons does a criminal act, each one of the remaining such other persons shall be liable for the act as if it had been done by him alone.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
Lord Dacre agreed with several persons to hunt in another’s park for deer and to kill who might resist. One of the parties killed the keeper of the park. All were held guilty of murder, although Lord Dacre was at a quarter of a mile distant and knew nothing of the fatal blow.
The armed persons entered a shop for committing robbery. On being disturbed by villagers they decided to retreat and in retreating they fired a number of shots at the pursuers one of whom was killed by a shot fired by one of them.
It was held that though the primary intention was to effect their escape and not to kill any one of the pursuers, it must be concluded from circumstances that their intention was to escape even by killing the pursuers, if necessary, and so this being the act of one accused in furtherance of the common intention of both the accused, viz., escape, the other accused could also be convicted of murder.
Section 34, I.P.C., is intended to meet a case where members of a party acted in furtherance of the common intention of all but it was difficult to prove exactly the part played by each of them. The principle which the section embodies is the participation in some action with the intention of committing a crime: once such participation is established, Section 34 is at once attracted.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
A pre-arranged plan may be hastily formed on the spur of the moment and be implicitly shared by all who are party to it equally as much as it may be long drawn, deliberated upon much in advance, and explicitly subscribed to by all.
There may be direct evidence, as to such a plan as in Lord Dacre’s case or such plan may be inferred from circumstances as in Murari Pal’s case. An act may be done by an offender with an intent different from the common intention, i.e., the intention which he shares with his co-offenders, but if such furthers or facilitates the common intention, each one of the other co-offenders shall be guilty of such act equally as much as it has been done by him alone.
Three persons assaulted the deceased and gave him a beating; one of them gave the fatal blow. It was held in the absence of proof that the common intention of the accused was to inflict injury likely to cause death; the other accused could not be convicted of murder.
Common intention presupposes a pre-arranged plan which should precede the commission of the crime but pre-arranged plan need not precede the commission of the crime by any great length of time. All that is required is that the pre-arranged plan must have come into existence before the crime is committed.
Common intention can be established by proving the existence of some overt act in the commission of the crime and must be similar or alike the act done by the main accused.
Common intention of villagers to enforce their right of way cannot be considered as a common intention to commit a criminal act within the meaning of Section 34, I.P.C. From the fact that one villager had a spade in his hand and the other two had sticks in their hands, it is not safe to draw the inference that they had intended to commit any offence. It is not proved that they met together, earlier. From the proved facts, it is not possible to draw a conclusive inference that they acted in concert, which is the essential requirement of Section 34, Indian Penal Code.
(2) Whenever an act, which is criminal only’ by reason of an act being done with a criminal knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act, with such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone with that knowledge or intention (Section 35).
A and B beat C who dies. A intended to murder him and knew that the act would cause death. B only intended to cause grievous hurt and did not know that his act would cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. A would be guilty of murder and B of causing grievous hurt.
(3) When an offence is committed by means of several acts whoever intentionally co-operates in the commission of that offence by doing any one of these acts, whether singly or partly with other persons, commits that offence (Section 37).
A and B agree to murder Z severally and at different times giving him small doses of poison. A and B administer the poison accordingly; Z dies from the effects of the several doses of poison so administered. Here both A and B are guilty of murder though their acts are separate, and doses administered individually might not have been sufficient to cause Z’s death.
(4) But when several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that act. (Section 38).
Illustration:
A attacks Z under such circumstances of grave provocation that his killing of Z would be only culpable homicide not amounting to murder. B having ill-will towards Z, and intending to kill him and not having been subject to the provocation, assists A in killing Z. Here though A and B are both engaged in causing Z’s death, B is guilty of murder and A is only of culpable homicide.
Bhaba Nanda v. State of Assam, In this case the Supreme Court had got an opportunity to explain Section 38 of I.P.C. Here three accused assaulted the victim where third accused did not use his lathi for causing injuries to the victim. The two accused were held liable for murder and third accused was held liable under Section 304, Part II of I.P.C.