Legal Provisions of Section 300 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), India.
Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence:
The section embodies the common law principle contained in the doctrine of autre fois acquit and autre fois convict which means that if a person is tried and acquitted or convicted of an offence he cannot be tried again for the same offence or on the same facts for any other offence. This doctrine is also incorporated in Article 20 (2) of the Constitution.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
Thus the rule is based on the principle that a person may not be put twice in jeopardy for the same offence. The six illustrations given in Section 300 explain the different situations, which constitute ‘same offence’ for invoking the provisions of this section. In order to bar the trial of a person already tried, it must be shown that—
(1) He had been tried by a competent Court for the same offence or one for which he might have been charged or convicted on the same facts;
(2) That he had been convicted or acquitted at the trial; and
(3) That such conviction or acquittal is in force.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
So the first requirement for the applicability of this section is that the earlier trial should have been before a competent Court which must have recorded a verdict of acquittal or conviction.
The word “tried” used in this section does not necessarily mean tried on merits. Thus compounding of an offence under Section 320 or a withdrawal by. the Public Prosecutor under Section 321, would result in an acquittal of the accused even though he was not tried on merits such an acquittal would bar subsequent trial of the accused on the same facts.
If in the earlier trial the Court was not competent to hear and decide the case, the – provision of this section will not be attracted. Thus where the conviction of a person and the sentence passed on him was set aside for want of proper sanction, it cannot be said that there was a proper trial and, therefore, the decision of that trial cannot operate as a bar under Section 300 of the Code.
The explanation, incorporated in this section makes it clear that the discharge of the accused or the dismissal of the complaint against him does not amount to his acquittal to bar his subsequent trial on the same facts.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
This section further requires that in order to bar the second prosecution and the consequential punishment there under the trial must be for the ‘same offence’. This in other words, means that the two offences should be identical. The section therefore, does not bar trial of different offences which may result from the commission or omission of the same act.
Thus where the accused was tried for the offence of breach of trust as a public servant and acquitted he can subsequently be tried for the same offence in respect of another misappropriation of a sum during the same period.
Again, where the charge on the second trial is for a different offence, the trial is not barred by Section 300. For instance, a conviction for the offence of affray under Section 160, IPC on a prosecution initiated by the police was held to be no bar to a subsequent trial for causing hurt under Section 323, IPC on a complaint by the party injured. So also, the offence under Section 409, IPC and Section 14 of the Provident Funds Act are not same offences. Likewise the offence under Section 105 of the Insurance Act and Section^09, IPC cannot be deemed to be the same offences.
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Section 300 and Double Jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution:
Section 300 CrPC and Article 200 (2) of the Constitution embody the well known principle of criminal jurisprudence that “no one should be put in peril twice for the same offence”. The only difference between the two provisions is that the former embodies both principles known as autrefois acquit and astrefois convict, while the latter only embodies the principle of astrefois convict.
Thus under Article 20 (2) of the Constitution, the bar is against a person being subjected to punishment twice for the same offence. It, therefore, follows that if at the previous trial, a person was acquitted; there will be no bar to his being tried again for the same offence under this Article.
The Supreme Court, in P.V. Mohammad Barmay Son v. Director of Enforcement has held that an offence under Section 81(2) of FERA, 1973 and evasion of excise duty under the Sea Customs Act, 1922 were two different offences and, therefore, the doctrine of ‘double jeopardy’ had no application in this case.
The facts of the case in brief were that the appellants purchased a few engines from foreign countries and made payment in foreign currency without clearance of the Reserve Bank of India thus contravening Sections 5 (1) (a) and (b) of FERA (Act 7 of 1947) which was later repealed and replaced by FERA (Act 46 of 1973).
The latter Act provided for higher penalty than the former one. The contravention was detected in 1974 after the replaced Act had come into force. Meanwhile the appellants were also proceeded against for evasion of excise duty under the Sea Customs Act, 1922 for which they were subsequently acquitted. In appeal against the imposition of punishment under the FERA, 1973, the Supreme Court upheld the punishment holding it perfectly legal and valid under Section 81(2) of FERA and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the appeal was, therefore, dismissed.
The question of validity of prosecution and punishment for same offence more than once came up for consideration before the High Court of Kerala in Abdul Salam v. State of Kerala. The Court held that where a person was prosecuted and punished in a foreign country for an offence under the law in force in that country, he could be prosecuted in India for the commission of an offence under law in force in India.
The reason being that the prosecution in India is not for the act which was made an offence under the law in force in foreign country, but it was for the act which was an offence as per the Indian law.
The Court emphasised that in order to attract the provision contained in Article 20 (2), identity of the offence is an essential prerequisite. Therefore, the previous prosecution and connection or acquittal does not bar a subsequent prosecution and trial for a separate and distinct offence even though the two offences arise out of the same facts.
Principle of Issue – Estoppel:
In fact, the principle of issue estoppel is not a sufficient ground which can bar a subsequent trial under Section 300 CrPC. It was in the case of Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, that certain observations were made by the Supreme Court relying upon the Privy Council’s decision in Samashivan v. Public Prosecutor Federation of Malaya, wherein Lord Dermot had observed that the maxim res judicata pro veritate acceptor is no less applicable to criminal proceedings than to civil proceedings. The facts of Pritam Singh’s case, illustrate the application of the role of issue – estoppel vis-a-vis Section 300, CrPC.
In that case the accused was charged under Section 19(F) of the Indian Arms Act for possessing a revolver without a licence and was acquitted as the prosecution could not prove that he was in possession of a revolver. In a subsequent trial of the accused for murder, it was held that the possession of revolver cannot be proved against the accused as the prosecution was bound by earlier decision on the point and was estopped from giving evidence to prove the contrary.
The principle of issue-estoppel subsequently found support in a number of decisions of the Supreme Court. The rule may be enunciated thus:
“Where an issue has been tried by a competent Court on a former occasion and the finding of fact has been reached in favour of the accused, such finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution; not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for different or distinct offences but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb the finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by law.” (i.e. Section 300(2) CrPC).
It must, however, be stated that in order to invoke the rule of issue-estoppel it is necessary that the parties in the two trials must be the same and fact-in-issue proved or not in the earlier trial must also be identical with the one which is raised and agitated in the subsequent trial.
Distinction between issue-estoppel or res judicata and double jeopardy or autre fois acquit.
Pointing out the distinction between issue-estoppel and double jeopardy, the Apex Court has observed, that the principle of issue estoppel is different from the rule of double jeopardy or autre fois acquit as embodied in Section 300, CrPC.
The principle of issue-estoppel is altogether a different principle where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent Court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of the accused.
Such finding would operate as an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial or conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding of evidence to disturb the earlier finding when an accused is tried subsequently for a different offence which might be permissible by Section 300 (2) of the Code.
For raising the plea of issue-estoppel there must be inevitably the same issue in the earlier proceedings between the same parties. Thus, any issue as between the State and one of the accused person in the same litigation cannot operate as binding upon the State with regard to another accused.
Relevant Cases:
Where a complaint filed under Section 20 of the N.D.P.S. Act by an Excise Inspector against the accused was dismissed on the ground that he was not legally competent to file the complaint, a subsequent complaint on the same facts filed by the competent authority against the same accused was held to be lawful and valid as there was no violation of Section 300 (1) of Cr.P.C.
The Supreme Court in State of Karnataka (through C.B.I.) v. C. Nagrajaswamy, held that Section 300 of the Code does not bar a second trial where the earlier prosecution was without proper sanction under Section 197, Cr. P.C. The Trial Court was not bound to record judgment of conviction or acquittal.
Even if the same was recorded, it could be said to have been rendered illegally without jurisdiction. Subsequent trial with proper sanction was not barred in such a case. Therefore, the order of the High Court quashing fresh charge-sheet on ground that no fresh trial permissible was liable to be set aside with direction to dispose of the matter expeditiously.
Where a complaint against the accused was dismissed for non-prosecution and consequently the accused was discharged, it was held that second complaint was not barred by Section 300 as discharge does not r mount to an acquittal for the purpose of this Section.
Where a writ petition was earlier filed following confiscation of gold under Sections 71 and 74 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968, it was held that the decision in writ petition will not operate as issue-estoppel in subsequent criminal prosecution under Section 85 (1) of the Gold Control Act for possession of undeclared primary gold.
A person against whom security proceedings are taken under Section 107, CrPC, similar proceedings against him may be initiated subsequently because he cannot be said to have committed an offence. So also dismissal in default of an application under Sections 125 and 126, CrPC does not amount to acquittal of an offence and, therefore, a second application on the facts is no bar under Section 300 of the Code.
In Balbir Singh v. State of Delhi accused was charged for offences under TADA Act but the proceedings were found to be futile in absence of sanction as required under the Act. Though the order passed by the concerned Court in that regard used the word ‘acquittal’ but in essence it could only operate as an order of ‘discharge’. Therefore, subsequent filing of charge sheet against the accused on obtaining requisite sanction does not amount to violation of provisions contained in Section 300, Cr.P.C.