Is it Necessary for a Quasi-Judicial Body to Give Reasons for the Decision in India?

(1) The question before the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court was whether the State Government is in law liable to state the reasons for an order refusing to interfere under section 7-F of the U.P. Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1974, with an order of the Commissioner passed under section 3 (3) of the Act.

It was held by the opinion of the majority that where an order of an inferior authority is carried in appeal or revision before a superior authority and the superior authority, in disposing of the appeal or revision makes an order in the exercise of quasi-judicial jurisdiction—

(1) In all cases where the superior authority interferes with the order of the inferior authority, the order of the supe­rior authority must set out its reasons.

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(2) In cases where superior authority merely affirms the order of the inferior authority, and

(a) Where the order of the inferior authority does not set out its reasons, the superior authority must close its reasons in its order;

(b) Where the order or the inferior authority sets out the writ of certiorari reasons, and

where the superior authority finds the reasons of the in­ferior authority acceptable to it, it need not specify the reasons in its order but may merely refer to the reasons given by the inferior authority or give an outline of the process of reasoning by which it finds itself in agree­ment with the inferior authority; where the superior authority does not find the reasons of the inferior authority acceptable to it, the superior authority must set out its own reasons its order.

With respect to an order of the State Government under Section 3 (1) of the Act, the Supreme Court observed that the State Govern­ment is not obliged to disclose the reasons which have influenced it in coming to its decision.

It was held by majority of the Full Bench decision of 5 Judges of the Allahabad High Court that the State Government is bound to give reasons for its order under section 7-F in:

(a) Proceedings arising out of an application under Sec. 3 for permission to a landlord to file a suit in civil court for the eviction of tenant from an accommodation; and

(b) Cases for the allotment of an accommodation.

The landlady petitioner filed an application under section 3 for permission to file a suit for eviction against the tenant, Qazi Mukhtar Ahmad, from the premises in dispute.

The application was rejected by R.C.& E.O. by an order dated June 21, 1965. The landlady’s revision against the above order was dismissed by the Commissioner on November 19, 1965. Thereupon, the petitioner made an application under Section 7-F but that too was rejected.

Hence the writ peti­tion. It was urged that the orders of the Commissioner or State Government did not give any reasons at all. The relevant portion of the order of the Commissioner read:

“I heard the learned counsel on both sides and gone through the record of the case. Considering everything and every cir­cumstances and keeping the balance of convenience in view of the order of the learned R.C. & E.O. cannot be held to be illegal or improper.”

It must be said that the Commissioner was exercising a quasi- judicial function and, even though he confirmed the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, he should have indicated his reasons for doing so. The order of the Commissioner did not set out any facts of the case nor did it at all show that the Commissioner applied his mind to the controversies arisen in the case.

He had given no reason whatever for confirming the findings of the Rent Control and Evic­tion Officer. The order of the State Government was of the same variety. It recited that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner did not accept the need of the landlady as genuine and refused to grant the permission to file a suit.

It then went on to say that it was not proper or necessary to interfere with the concurrent or­ders of the subordinate authorities. The order of the State Govern­ment also therefore did not give any reason why it was considered not proper to interfere with the orders of the subordinate authorities.

The order did not state either that it agreed with the findings of the R.C.& E.O. that the need of the landlady was not genuine or that after comparing the needs of the landlady and the tenant, the need of the tenant was found to be greater.

It must be held that neither the order of the Commissioner nor that of the Government complied with the requirement of stating reasons.

Consequently, the writ petition has to be allowed, the orders of the Commissioner and of the State Government are liable to be quashed and the Government has to be directed to re-entertain the revision and to dispose it off in accordance with law.

Though the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, not provide for an order rejecting a bid at auction being supported by reasons, if the highest bid given at an auction conducted under Rule 90 which is substantially above the reserve price, is rejected by the competent authority (the Managing officer), he must support his order with reasons.

This is so because an order rejecting or not approving a bid is subject to appeal and is likely to affect the civil right of the highest bidder.

It is not for the High Court to control the discretion of the com­petent authority to approve or reject a particular bid. At the same time, the Court will not hesitate to quash an order rejecting a bid if the reason given in support of such an order is:

(a) Utterly extraneous, or

(b) Not at all germane-

(i) To the question of the sale property, or

(ii) To the question of the price which it has to fetch for the compensation pool.

But where the competent authority rejects the highest bid on the ground that the property would fetch more price if put to re- auction, and where the highest bid offered for the property at the time of the auction was only insignificantly higher than the bid given six years earlier, it cannot be said that the Managing officer went off the track in considering the probability of a higher price being fetched in case of resale of the property.

Therefore, the Settlement Commissioner had not accepted the bid himself but had left the matter of acceptance or rejection of the bid to the authorised Managing officer, and the Managing officer rejected the bid by his order, and his order is sup­ported by a reason which is not invalid in the circumstances of the case.

It was held by the Supreme Court:

1. The State Government ought to have disposed of the statutory appeal of the appellant filed under section 2A (2) of the Hyderabad Abolition of Inams and Cash Grants Act, 1954, by a speaking order.

2. It may not be possible in all cases to say that a non-speaking order is bad or invalid on that account alone, but when an order is li­able to be challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, Courts do insist that an appeal of the kind filed by the appel­lant should be and ought to have been disposed of by a speaking order giving some reason in its support.

3. But, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the High Court did not rightly set aside the order of the State Government and remit back the appellant’s appeal to them merely on that account. No determination or adjudication of facts was involved. The decision of the case rested on the points of law. (Rangnath v. Daulatrao, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2146).