Delegation of Rule-making Power to the Execu­tive by the Indian Legislature

Delegation of rule-making power:

It is competent for the Legislature to delegate to other authorities the power to frame rules to carry out the purposes of the law made by it.

In Raj Narain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Com­mittee. A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 569: (1956) 1 S.C.R. 290, the delegation was held to go to the extent of authorising an executive authority to modify the law made, but not in any essential feature. It was also ob­served that what constitutes essential feature cannot be enunciated in general terms.

Therefore, it is clear that delegation of legislative functions can be made to executive authorities within certain limits.

For instance, section 3 of the All-India Services Act, 1951 lays down that the Central Government may, after consultation with the Governments of the State concerned make rules for regulation or recruitment and con­ditions of service of persons appointed to an All-India Service. It also lies down that all rules made under this section—

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(a) Shall be laid for not less than 14 days before Parliament as soon as possible after they are made and

(b) Shall be subject to such modifications, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as Parliament may make on a motion made during the session in which they are so laid.

Regulation of recruitment and conditions of service requires numerous and varied rules which may have to be changed from time to time as the exigencies of public service require.

So it cannot be held that these numerous and varied rules should be framed by the Parliament itself and that any amendment it of these rules which may be required to meet the difficulties of day-to-day administration should also be made by Parliament only with all the attending delays which passing of legislation entails and that nothing should be delegated to the executive authorities.

Therefore, the Parliament has power to delegate power to the Central Government to frame rules for regulation of recruitment and conditions of service.

Therefore, the Central Government framed the All-India Ser­vices (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, under section 3 of All- India Services Act, 1951.

Section 3 (1) of the Patna Administration Act of 1915 em­powered the Local Government to extend to Patna the provisions of any section of the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884 subject to such restrictions and modification as the Local Government may think fit.

Section 5 of the same Act of 1915 provided that the Local Govern­ment may, at any time, cancel or modify any order under section 3.

The notification was issued under section 8 (1) (f) and section 5. This notification subjected certain persons to taxation.

Its vires was challenged in Raj Narain Singh’s case (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 569) and it was held by the Supreme Court that the action of the Governor in subjecting the residents of Patna to municipal taxation without ob­serving the formalities imposed by sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act of 1922, cuts across one of its essential features touching a matter of policy and so the Notification is bad.

The Act of 1922 applied to the whole of Bihar and Orissa and one of its essential features was that no municipality competent to tax shall be thrust upon a locality without giving its inhabitants a chance of being heard and of being given an opportunity to object. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act of 1922 afforded a statutory guarantee to this effect.

Therefore, the Local Government has under a statutory duty im­posed by the Act in mandatory terms to listen to the objections and take them into consideration before reaching a decision. This is a matter of policy imposed by the Legislature.

It cannot be left to an executive authority to tear up this guarantee in disregard of the Legislature’s solemnly expressed mandate.

To do so would be to change the policy of the law. Therefore, it was held in case that the Notification effected a radical change in the policy in the Act, travelled beyond the authority conferred by section 3 (1) (f) and was, therefore, ultra vires.